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Comment/Summons of Taxpayers' Records:
Conflicting Standards of Proof
For Judicial Enforcement:
The Solution of Reisman v. Caplin.
TAXPAYER PAID HIS TAXES for 1958 and 1959. The taxes had received one
examination by Internal Revenue. In 1963 Internal Revenue, by letter' and
summons, 2 directed taxpayer to produce his books and records relating to the
years 1958 and 1959, because it deemed it necessary to make a reinvestigation
in order to verify properly taxpayer's returns for those years. Meanwhile, the
statute of limitations3 for assessment and collection of taxes for those years
had expired, except if fraud or willful attempt to evade was involved. Tax-
payer informed Internal Revenue that, in view of the fact that the limitation
statute had run, the reexamination request was unreasonable, and that unless
taxpayer was given some indication or showing of fraud or some indication
of the allegation or justification for opening such closed years, he would not
comply with the order. Internal Revenue then filed a petition4 in the District
Court for enforcement of its summons.
The fact pattern just presented is typical of cases referred to in this com-
ment. The basic elements usually involved in the pattern are: a) statutory
authorization for investigation of tax returns, b) a letter or summons by
Internal Revenue directing taxpayer or third parties either to appear or to
submit records, c) a refusal by taxpayer, usually based on a statute of limita-
tions, d) a request by taxpayer for facts or a showing of probable cause in-
dicating that fraud was involved, e) a refusal of taxpayer's request, and
f) either a petition by Internal Revenue to the District Court to enforce its
summons, or a petition by taxpayer to enjoin production of a third party's
records which relate to taxpayer's returns. This comment will consider the
standard of proof which courts should apply in deciding whether to enforce
the summons.
" INT. REV. CODE of 1954, 26 U.S.C. § 7601.
2 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, 26 U.S.C. § 7602.
'INT. REV. CODE of 1954,26 U.S.C. § 6501.
'INT. REv. CODE Of 1954, 26 U.S.C. § 7604 (b).
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The conflicting decisions among the Circuit Courts as to whether suspicion
alone is or is not sufficient to warrant enforcement of the summons will be
presented and analyzed. As the split now stands, only the Supreme Court can
define what the standard should be. Reisman v. Caplin5 will be offered as the
possible solution to the problem. Two of the cases presented (one on each side
of the split) are presently before the Supreme Court, were argued in mid-
October, and are awaiting decision; 6 this comment intends no further refer-
ence to these two cases other than to present them as cases representing op-
posing views-it makes no suggestion or referenec to their particular dis-
positions. The parenthetical "should the court enforce" refers only to a
possible disposition by a District Court upon a petition for enforcement or
injunction.
In a case where the statute of limitations has barred Internal Revenue from
reopening closed years, except for fraud or willful attempt to evade, should
the court enforce the summons, or should it require Internal Revenue to show
reasonable belief or probable cause that fraud has been committed? Involved
in the question is whether Internal Revenue has the right to examine closed
years on suspicion, or whether taxpayer has the right to demand that a reason-
able justification support Internal Revenue's request.
The District Court in the Powell case ultimately decided upon a com-
promise order which expressed dissatisfaction with Internal Revenue's refusal
to present testimony, and agreement with taxpayer's position, but which,
nevertheless, directed taxpayer to make his books available for a one hour
inspection to be held at a specified time and date. Taxpayer appealed.
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the compromise order, hold-
ing that section 7604 (b), under which Internal Revenue brought its petition
for enforcement of its summons, requires the production of satisfactory proof
and a hearing of the case as a basis for granting the requested enforcement.
7
In addition, the court stated that, since section 7605 (b) of the Internal Re-
venue Code8 prohibits unnecessary examinations, and, since the limitation
statute barred the assessment, "logically, therefore, a reexamination of his
records must be unnecessary within the meaning of section 7605 (b) unless
something has been discovered by the Secretary's delegate which might cause
a reasonable man to suspect that there has been fraud in the return for the
otherwise closed years." 9 The Third Circuit's decision dramatized the split
among the circuits on the issue of enforcing summonses which summarily
and without reason demand taxpayers' records for years closed by normal
5375 U.S. 440 (1964).
6 United States v. Powell, October Term, 1964, Docket No. 54.
Ryan v. United States, October Term, 1964, Docket No. 12.
'United States v. Powell, 325 F.2d 914 (3rd Cir. 1963).
8
INT. REV. CODE of 1954, 26 U.S.C. § 7605 (b).
"Supra note 7.
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operation of a statute of limitations. It put squarely in opposition the Second
Circuit's decision in Foster v. United States,'0 wherein that court held that a
mere allegation of fact in an affidavit submitted by Internal Revenue stating
that the records were necessary to authenticate taxpayer's claim was sufficient
to justify an order directing a bank to produce records of one of its depositors,
even though a portion of the period described by the records had been closed
by the statute of limitations.
Because of the conflict between the circuits the Supreme Court granted
certiorari,11 and the Powell case, along with Ryan v. United States,'2 were
docketed for the October 1964 term. 13
I
SPLIT AMONG THE CIRCUITS
The split among the circuits over the quantum of proof which Internal Re-
venue must present before a District Court will enforce its summons directing
appearance or production of certain records may be summarized as follows.
Supporting the thinking of the Third Circuit in Powell is the opinion of the
First Circuit in O'Connor v. O'Connell.4 In O'Connor, Internal Revenue
summoned taxpayer under 7602 (which was the authority for the summons
in Powell and Ryan) to appear. When the particular years 1943 to 1947 came
up for discussion, taxpayer refused to testify, arguing that there was no claim
that he had failed to file for those years, and that, absent a showing of fraud,
the statute of limitations barred the assessment of taxes for those years. Since
records for at least one of the years had been destroyed, Internal Revenue's
argument for deficiency was calculated on the tax actually paid for the years
in question. Taxpayer replied that proof of deficiency was not proof of fraud.
Taxpayer took the position that until Internal Revenue submitted evidence
that would show (or even tend to show) fraud for those years, he would not
obey the summons. Internal Revenue argued that it was not required to make
such a showing. The District Court agreed with Internal Revenue and granted
its petition to enforce the summons on the basis that the court "be satisfied
that the agent from his investigation of matters available to him had grounds
to conclude that there was reasonable suspicion that the taxpayer had made a
false or fraudulent return." 15 The First Circuit reversed, holding that when
Internal Revenue seeks court enforcement of its summons requiring testimony
as to a closed year it "should be required to establish to the court's satisfaction
10265 F.2d 183 (2nd Cir. 1959).
"377 U. S. 929 (1964).
"United States v. Ryan, 320 F.2d 500 (6th Cir. 1963).
"Supra note 6.
'253 F.2d 365 (1st Cir. 1958).
15 Id. at 368.
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that there is probable cause for an investigation into such a year."' 6 In reject-
ing the suspicion standard allowed by the lower court for one of probable
cause the court reasoned thus: while 7602 authorizes the issuance of summons,
and while 7604 (b) provides for enforcement of such summons in the local
district court, section 7605 (b) prohibits any unnecessary examination or
investigation. An attempt to reopen tax years after the passage of a consider-
able number of years, when supporting testimony might then be unavailable
to taxpayer, creates a burden on the taxpayer-an unnecessary burden if no
support other than reasonable suspicion is given for the investigation. Con-
gress, the court stated, in enacting 7605 (b) sought to curb "excessive ad-
ministration zeal" by protecting the taxpayer from unnecessary examination.'"
Sections 7602 and 7604 (b) cannot, therefore, be read apart from 7605 (b), and
necessity based upon suspicion may not be substituted for necessity based upon
a showing of probable cause; otherwise in Internal Revenue's view the
necessity for an investigation would for all practical purposes be left to
administrative determination (defeating thereby the legislative intent behind
the 7604 (b) petition statute and the "unnecessary" requirement of 7605 (b)),
and the court's function under 7604 (b) would be reduced to stamping its
approval to administrative action.
Supporting the Third Circuit in Powell and the First Circuit in O'Connor
are the Ninth Circuit opinions in Martin v. Chandris Securities8 and De-
Masters v. Arend.19 Chandris Co. was a family venture. At issue were alleged
deficiencies in the wife's returns. In 1939 a summons was served on the com-
pany under the predecessor 20 of 7602 for production of the third person
company's records for the years 1916 to 1930. The years were barred by the
limitation statute. Chandris Co. refused to obey. Internal Revenue petitioned
for enforcement of its summons under the predecessor 2' of 7604 (b). Its peti-
tion alleged only that the wife's 1930 return was under investigation, and that
Chandris Co. had custody of certain records bearing upon the wife's 1930
return. By attached affidavit Internal Revenue stated that it had a "strong
suspicion" 22 that fraud had been committed and that the books were necessary
to determine whether the wife did commit fraud. The District Court eventual-
ly denied Internal Revenue's petition on the grounds that, as the limitation
period had expired, assessment was barred unless proof or showing of fraud
was made, and that the examination of such records under the predecessor 23
O'Connor v. O'Connell, 253 F.2d 365 at 370 (1st Cir. 1958).
'TId. at 369.
's 128 F.2d 731 (9th Cir. 1942).
10 315 F.2d 79 (9th Cir. 1963).
0 Internal Revenue Act of 1928, 26 U.S.C. § 3615 (a).
2 Internal Revenue Act of 1928, 26 U.S.C. § 3633.
Supra note 18, at 734.
2 Internal Revenue Act of 1928, 26 U.S.C. § 3631.
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of 7605 (b) was unnecessary. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, adding to the Dis-
trict Court's grounds the following interesting reasoning: since the Revenue
Act of 1928 contained no provision specifying the procedure to be followed
in invoking the jurisdiction of the District Court, the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure would apply. The petition would be treated as a complaint which
under Rule 8 (a) had to contain "a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. '24 Therefore, as the statute
had barred opening the years involved, except for fraud, and as the "com-
plaint" had failed to state any claim for relief because it failed to state any
facts showing that the investigation was not unnecessary, the petition should
not be enforced. The court stated that as the case was covered by statutory
requirements Internal Revenue must act within their terms; i.e., as the only
exemption to the limitation statute was one for fraudulent return with intent
to evade, Internal Revenue, in order to gain the statutory exemption, must
show a reasonable basis for suspicion (which the First Circuit in O'Connor
equated with probable cause 25 ) rather than allege strong suspicion. This
followed because "reasonable basis" or "probable cause" would satisfy the
statutory requirement of not being unnecessary, whereas "strong suspicion"
would not. The statutory requirement of being necessary, the court believed,
was a limitation on the investigative power of Internal Revenue. It is im-
portant to note the connection the First Circuit drew in O'Connor, and the
Third Circuit recognized in Powell, between the "unnecessary" provision of
7605 (b) and the evidentiary standard required for enforcement of an ad-
ministrative summons under 7604 (b): for an investigation to be necessary,
as the statute requires when the year is barred by lapse of time, the evidence
presented upon petition for enforcemnt must be such as will show probable
cause. This is the same connection the court in Chandris in 1942 drew be-
tween the requirements of the predecessor statutes, sections 3631 and 3633,
respectively. In Chandris the court further noted Internal Revenue's con-
tention "that the only showing required ... is a 'showing of probable cause,
sometimes called reasonable ground for suspicion of fraud'." 26 In light of this,
and because the requirements of 7604 (b) and 7605 (b) are the same as those
of their predecessors 3633 and 3631, Internal Revenue's contention today
should be the same, and not a contention based merely on the relevancy or
materiality of the records to the proposed investigation.
In 1963 in DeMasters v. Arend, supra, the Ninth Circuit held to the same
effect. Internal Revenue's basis for investigating was a calculated deficiency
finding resulting from computations from various sources which indicated
an increase in taxpayer's net worth. A summons was issued to taxpayer's
FED. R. Civ. P. 8 (a).
21 Supra note 16.
1 Supra note 18, at 735.
[1965]
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bank to produce records pertaining to taxpayer's transactions with the bank
during some of the years in questions. Taxpayer obtained a permanent
injunction from the District Court on the ground that Internal Revenue had
failed to prove that there were "any reasonable grounds or other probable
cause to find or suspect that any fraud existed. ... 27 The Ninth Circuit
reversed. In that opinion, which does not appear to carry the force or clarity
of the same Circuit's reasoning in Chandris, the court found that although it
was shown that the limitation bar required Internal Revenue "to go forward
with a justification of their inquiry ... this they did ... ,,2
A weak point in DeMasters leading to confusion among the circuits may
be detected. The court alludes to the principle that the investigative power,
being inquisitorial in nature, does not depend, even when the years are
closed, upon a showing of probable cause to believe that a violation had
occurred.29 At the stage at which the court received the DeMasters case there
had been only an investigation, and not a petition for enforcement under
7604 (b). Therefore, even in the absence of a showing of probable cause, no
objection to a mere investigation of closed years would be allowed (if
probable cause applies only to a 7604 (b) petition and not to a 7601 investiga-
tion or a 7602 summons. Nevertheless the court did apply a rational judg-
ment standard, in accordance with Chandris and O'Connor, when only the
validity of the inquiry and not the right to a petition for enforcement was
in question. That Internal Revenue's decision to investigate was reached as
a matter of rational judgment was related to the unnecessary requirement of
7605 (b).
The courts have never clearly defined the requirements under the ap-
plicable Code provisions: what is unnecessary, probable cause, reasonable
ground or basis for suspicion, whether there is a distinction in the proof
burden under 7602, 7604 (b) or 7605, and whether the burden under the
7605 "unnecessary" requirement applies to a summons or to an enforcement
petition. This lack of definition contributes to the confusion seen in De-
Masters. There the court applied a "rational judgment" test in questioning
the validity of an investigation (by finding that Internal Revenue did in
fact act on rational judgment); in the same opinion it stated that it is
questionable whether there is any limitation applied to the investigative
power. Confusion exists on both sides of the split, particularly in the proof
burden applicable to the various statutory provisions; Reisman will help
dispel the confusion.
Within the Second Circuit, the District Court for the Eastern District of
'1Supra note 19, at 84.




New York, in In re Brooklyn Pawnbrokers, Inc.,30 after stating the general
rule that courts deny the government examination rights in connection with
tax years closed by the statute of limitations except in fraud cases, asked the
basic question: what justifies the fraud exception? Its answer was that al-
though the government should not be required to prove actual fraud, it
should "set forth facts which lead it to believe that there may have been
fraud"31 and which will allow the court to determine whether the suspicion
is sufficiently based in fact to justify the examination. In holding against the
examination of closed years, the court said "to permit the government to
examine . . . upon a mere conclusory allegation of fraud is to deprive the
taxpayer of that freedom from unreasonable harassment which he has a right
to expect under a democratic form of government." 32 The court felt it would
be no undue burden to require the government to set forth facts leading it to
suspect fraud.
We have seen that the First, Third and Ninth Circuits, in O'Connor,
Powell, and Chandris, respectively, have expressly required a showing of
probable cause in order to secure court enforcement of Internal Revenue's
summons. For purposes of this comment, taxpayer's position is sufficiently
well illustrated by these cases.
The argument on the other side of the split is simply that Internal Revenue
is not required to establish that probable cause exists. The following cases
present the argument. In United States v. Ryan, supra, the usual fact pattern
appears. The allegations by Internal Revenue were that "reasonable grounds
exist for a strong suspicion" 33 and that the records are "relevant and ma-
terial"3 4 to the question of tax liability. Taxpayer argued that probable
cause or a reasonable basis for suspicion must be established to the satisfac-
tion of the court. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the enforcement of the summons.
It stated that the statutory provisions place no limitation upon Internal
Revenue's right to investigate, except that the examination not be unneces-
sary in accordance with 7605 (b).
Although the case reached the court by a petition for judicial action under
7604 (b), the court appears to have treated it as one involving only an
investigation. In other words, when the petition might depend upon a
showing of probable cause, the court applied a "relevant or material" mean-
ing to the "unnecessary" limitation, the true essence of which, according to
the opposing view, contains the requirement of a showing of probable cause.
It would seem that the application of the "unnecessary" requirement of
30 39 F. Supp. 304 (E.D.N.Y. 1941).
31 Id. at 304, 305.
8
2Id. at 305.
'3Supra note 13, at 501.
13 bid.
[1965]
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7605 (b) without the realization that it might carry an inherently heavy
standard lessens the worth of the statute and adds to the confusion earlier
referred to, as to whether there is or should be a valid distinction between
investigations and enforcement proceedings.
It is submitted that in light of Reisman there need be no distinction
between, and little confusion over, standards of proof necessary in enforce-
ment proceedings.
Ryan was brought on a petition: should a "relevant or material" standard
satisfy the court to allow it to grant the petition when it might not even
satisfy the "unnecessary" requirement of 7605 (b)? "Relevant or material" is
the phrase used in the 7602 summons provision. Standing alone its meaning
is rather clear; i.e., that Internal Revenue is authorized to examine any books
which may lend information to its proposed investigation. However, when
7605 (b) requires that the investigation be necessary, should a standard other
than "relevant or material" be applied? Although the records may be relevant
or material to the inquiry, does it follow that "relevant or material" becomes
the standard to support a petition to enforce a summons? Under the rationale
of Chandris, which applied adversary standards of procedure under the
Federal Rules, Ryan would have been decided differently; it is submitted that
Reisman and Chandris are in accord with respect to the nature of a 7604 (b)
proceeding. Ryan did state that its affirmance was grounded on the fact that
the District Court's conclusion was reached by weighing the testimony of
Internal Revenue; the weakness of the conclusion seems to lie in the applica-
tion of "relevant or material" to the only limitation on Internal Revenue's
right to investigate.
On its face, the Second Circuit's decision in Foster v. United States3 5 is the
strongest case for the proposition that allegations of fact, without more, are
sufficient to support a 7604 (b) petition for enforcement. The fact pattern
applies, except that the summons is directed, as in Chandris, to a third party.
The decision is based on the following inductive reasoning: a) the allegations
of Internal Revenue were uncontroverted, b) the records were relevant or
material to the investigation, thus c) an affirmative showing of probable cause
for the administrative inquiry was not required. The court stated that "the
same principles and criteria are applicable to the enforcement of Internal
Revenue subpoenas."3 6 Thus, it applied the "relevant or material" standard
of point b) of its reasoning to investigations and summons enforcement
proceedings alike-as was done in Ryan, except in Ryan such application
was not the sole basis for the court's decision. Using the reasoning of the
Foster statement above, it would follow that if the standard eventually set
for enforcement proceedings was one of probable cause, that standard should
85 Supra note 11.8 1Id. at 186.
[Vol. XIV
Comments
apply also to the right to investigate. This is not argued by any case, and
would be obviated by the reasoning in Reisman. However, without Reisman,
a valid argument could be made that, if the standard set for 7604 (b) petitions
was one of probable cause, it would cut across petition proceedings and in-
vestigations alike by means of the 6501 "limitation" provision and the
7605 (b) "unnecessary" requirement. Foster disposed of the "time limitation"
argument by stating that Internal Revenue, as a condition under 7602 and
7604 (b). "should not be required to prove grounds for belief that the liability
was not time-barred 'prior to the examination of the only records which
provide the ultimate proof'."3 7 Were this so, 6501 would be no protection
to the taxpayer, as mere suspicion could negate the bar Congress provided.
Further, it would render almost barren the protection Congress provided in
the "unnecessary" requirement of 7605 (b), because relevancy or materiality
can easily be shown.
The general question raised, then, by Ryan and Foster is: do statutory
provisions on the books place a limitation on Internal Revenue's right to
investigate? Such is the argument and decisional law showing the split. Con-
fusion has resulted from a lack of definition of the requirements of the Code;
it has perpetuated itself through misapplication of evidentiary standards to
an Internal Revenue investigation. In the following manner, it is submitted,
Reisman bares the conflict and sets at rest the irritating points of difference
noted above in the decisions.
II
Reisman v. Caplin
When the Reisman case came to the Supreme Court the only action taken by
Internal Revenue had been the issuance of a 7602 summons to an accounting
firm to produce records relating to taxpayers' return. The statute of limita-
tions was not involved. Reisman was taxpayers' attorney who had hired the
accounting firm. He petitioned the District Court for declaratory and in-
junctive relief, claiming that the enforced production of the accounting
firm's records was an unlawful appropriation of his work product and trial
preparation, as well as an unreasonable seizure requiring taxpayers to in-
criminate themselves and depriving them of effective assistance of counsel.
The District Court denied the petition on the grounds that Reisman had no
standing to sue, that the records called for were not his work product, that
he failed to state a cause of action, and that the records did not fall within
the attorney-client privilege. The Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia affirmed, but on the ground of sovereign immunity, that the suit
was one against the United States to which it had not consented.3
8 The
87 id. at 187.
Reisman v. Caplin, 317 F.2d 123 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
[1965]
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Supreme Court affirmed the decision, but on these procedural grounds: that
as there had been no petition for judicial enforcement of the summons,
Reisman could not test the summons by a preliminary injunction and a
motion to set aside the summons. In effect, the Court held that such practice,
though heretofore accepted in some circuits, was a premature interference in
an administrative proceeding, and that the place to judicially test the sum-
mons was in a court petitioned to enforce it. This is not to say that a taxpayer
cannot attack the summons. He may challenge it before Internal Revenue,
on any grounds (including the constitutionality of the summons) for the
Court remarked that it had "never passed upon the rights of a party sum-
moned.., under 7602." 39 But, he may not do so in an injunction suit before
a District Court prior to such time as Internal Revenue files a 7604 (b) en-
forcement petition. As this stage had not yet come to pass, the Court held
that Reisman had an adequate remedy at law as provided by the Code, that
he should proceed according to the Code, and that the complaint should be
dismissed for want of equity.
This comment is not primarily concerned with the procedural aspects of
Reisman.40 Nor will it brief the point of attorney-client privilege, nor the
constitutional point of unreasonable seizure. The significance of Reisman is
the conclusory principle that Internal Revenue upon an enforcement petition
must show probable cause that fraud exists before it can obtain a District
Court's approval. By using the exhaustion of remedies doctrine, the Court
left only one stage at which the summons may be judicially attacked. This
stage would be "an adversary proceeding affording a judicial determination
of the challenges to the summons and giving complete protection to the
witness." 41 Only the District Court can direct compliance with the summons,
or issue a writ of attachment for contempt; Internal Revenue "has no power
of enforcement or right to levy any sanctions." 42 If the summons is challenged,
Internal Revenue must defend in order to prevail; i.e., in accordance with
Rule 8 (a) of the Federal Rules, Internal Revenue must present "a short and
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief."43
(emphasis added). Furthermore, under well established rules, fraud must be
pleaded specifically; a plea, or a plea in bar, must state ultimate facts-an
allegation is ineffective in raising the issues.4 4 The logical conclusion is that
in separating the functions of the administrative proceeding from the judicial
Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440, 445 (1964).
40 For a discussion of the procedural effect of Reisman, see 52 Illinois Bar Journal 874
(1964).
4 'Supra note 49, at 446. This same thought was advanced by the court in Martin v. Chan-
dris, supra note 26.
12 Id. at 466.
'supra note 32.
"24 Am. Jur. Fraud and Deceit 243 et seq. (1939).
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process the Court did not ascribe the standards allowable in the former as
permissible in the latter. Within the Court's decision is the meaning that the
"satisfactory proof" requirement of 7604 (b) demands more than suspicion or
allegation of fraud.
CONCLUSION
Reisman says many things in few words; it subjects to questioning the con-
stitutional rights of taxpayers summoned by Internal Revenue. For our
purposes, the fact that Reisman requires the taxpayer (and Internal Revenue)
to work within the procedural framework of the Code eliminates the con-
fusion over the standard of proof Internal Revenue must meet, and links
together the requirements of the "petition" clause, 7604 (b), and the "un-
necessary" clause, 7605 (b), for if there is only one stage at which the summons
may be judicially challenged, at that stage the petition must be shown not to
be unnecessary. If this be so, that the one standard be that of probable cause,
the principle of Reisman, which could not be applied to its own case because
barred by the exhaustion of remedies doctrine, will prevent unnecessary
litigation45 by providing a clear view of opposing rights and duties under a
summons. A possible remaining question is answered by pointing out that if
Internal Revenue does not file a 7604 (b) petition, a taxpayer suffers no harm
by contempt possibility because only the court can issue an attachment; if
Internal Revenue does petition under 7604 (b) a taxpayer need only show
that his challenge of the summons was made in good faith, in order to avoid
being charged with contempt.*
* Since the writing of this comment, Powell and Ryan have been decided. (33 U.S.L. WEEK
4026, November 24, 1964). The Court held that IRS "need make no showing of probable
cause .... It stated that the "unnecessary" requirement of 7605 (b) should not be equated
with probable cause. Its underlying reasoning is that since 7602 authorizes IRS to investigate
any tax liability, any equation of necessity with probable cause "might seriously hamper
... in carrying out investigations" thought to be warranted, thus forcing litigation of the
very subject to be investigated. In so deciding, the Court limits Reisman "to cover persons
who were summoned and wholly made default or contumaciously refused to comply." (leav-
ing the questioning taxpayer, it seems, on the horns of a dilemna: either he defaults and
contumaciously refuses to comply in order to risk the possibility of judicial prohibition of
the summons, or he complies with the summons and secures the redoubtable privilege of
filing an after-the fact objection in the District Court).
'5 E.g., DeMasters v. Arend, supra note 27-an injunctive proceeding where no petition for
enforcement had been filed.
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